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THE PROSPECT OF MULTI-LEVEL VOTING IN POST-PEACE ACCORD 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
 
 
Roger Mac Ginty 
 
 
Abstract 
This article reviews the possibility of multi-level voting in Northern Ireland in the wake 
of the 1998 peace accord. Post-peace accord elections can act as powerful indicators of 
the fate of a peace. Using Reif and Schmitt’s framework of second-order elections, it 
finds some evidence of varying electoral behaviour according to the electoral arena. The 
article also uses original data from a major opinion survey to assess public attitudes 
towards the suite of governing institutions with powers in or over a devolved Northern 
Ireland. The evidence of multi-level voting is limited and does not extend to electors 
abandoning ethnic voting patterns in the new political dispensation. In fact, it is argued 
that the very nature of the peace process has encouraged a re-entrenchment of exclusive 
nationalism and unionism. 
  
Introduction 
Northern Ireland’s 1998 Belfast Agreement saw the introduction of a new set of 
governing institutions, including an elected powersharing assembly. The new political 
configuration offered the possibility of changes in voting behaviour in a society 
characterized by profound ethnonational fissures and entrenched ethnic voting patterns. 
This article assesses if there has been any evidence of multi-level voting in Northern 
Ireland in the wake of devolution from the United Kingdom. Multi-level voting, as 
identified by Reif and Schmitt (1980), notes variations in electoral behaviour according 
to electoral arena. In other words, the article considers if has devolution and the context 
of a peace accord has caused significant changes in voting patterns in Northern Ireland.  
Following a brief contextual overview of Northern Ireland’s peace process and 
accord, the article considers the implications of elections in the aftermath of peace 
accords in cases of ethnonational conflicts. Then, using Reif and Schmitt’s second-order 
election model, the article examines trends in post-accord elections in Northern Ireland, 
with particular reference to levels of participation and the development of new and small 
political parties. A discussion of Northern Ireland’s voting patterns, as measured against 
the second-order election model, then follows and is aided by material from the Northern 
Ireland Life and Times survey of political attitudes. This material reinforces the 
argument that Northern Ireland’s electors view the Northern Ireland Assembly (a 
‘second-order’ institution) as first order. The wider question of the implications of 
elections in post-accord peacebuilding is also revisited in the discussion section.  
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The Northern Ireland peace process and accord 
 
Briefly, the Northern Ireland conflict is between two sets of nationalism, broadly 
fitting into the Protestant-unionist-loyalist bloc who favour continued maintenance of the 
Union with the United Kingdom, and the pro-united Ireland Catholic-nationalist-
republican bloc (Whyte, 1991; O’Leary & McGarry, 1993). Both groups share the same 
territory, and although the Northern Ireland state (founded in 1921) has always had a 
Protestant majority, the Catholic minority has been of sufficient size to maintain 
Protestant anxiety. The macro problems of the contested legitimacy of the state were 
reflected at the issue level where policing, employment and social provision by the state 
had a distinctly sectarian flavour. From the late 1960s onwards, nationalist discontent 
developed into disorder and, eventually, political violence. A low level triangular 
insurgency between the British state, loyalist and republican insurgents cost over 3,000 
lives in the 1968-94 period (Fay, Morrissey & Smyth: 1999).  
The peace process of the 1990s emerged from a classic ‘mutually hurting 
stalemate’ (Zartman, 1989) in which the antagonists realised that unilateral action, by 
themselves or others actors, would not be enough to bring major qualitative change to an 
entrenched conflict. Of mutual interest was a lowering of the costs of the conflict. The 
sovereign power in Northern Ireland, the British government, recognised from the mid-
1980s onwards that the Irish government (as proxy guardians of Northern Ireland’s 
nationalist minority) should be involved in any concerted attempt to manage the conflict. 
There followed the development of a remarkable British-Irish intergovernmental 
relationship (Arthur, 2000). The two governments adopted the principle of inclusion 
through which (violent) veto-holders with the potential to destabilise any agreement from 
without were consciously included in peace talks. With the two governments acting as 
custodians of a developing peace process, loyalist and republican militants felt confident 
enough to call ceasefires and allow Northern Ireland’s political parties to investigate 
proposals for the governance of Northern Ireland that would offer guarantees to the two 
main communities. Intensive multi-party talks held in 1997-98 were not without drama 
and interruption but an agreement was reached in April 1998 (Mac Ginty & Darby, 
2002). 
At 10,000 words, the Belfast Agreement was a complex document that confirmed 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional status within the United Kingdom (Wilford, 2001; Bell, 
2001; Horowitz, 2002). Northern Ireland’s constitutional status would be linked to 
popular support, with both governments pledged to facilitate Irish unification if this was 
the popular will. Three new institutions were established to deal with the complex set of 
relationships that defined the Northern Ireland conflict. An Assembly with a 
powersharing Executive would serve relationships in Northern Ireland. A North-South 
Ministerial Council would allow for functional cooperation between the Irish government 
and the Northern Ireland Executive on selected matters. A British-Irish Council would 
provide a forum for cooperation between representatives from elected institutions across 
the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Alongside the new institutional architecture, the 
Agreement made provision for the early release of prisoners from militant groups, reform 
of the police force and criminal justice system, and the establishment of bodies with 
oversight on equality and human rights (Bell, 2001). In short, the Agreement ushered in 
an advanced form of consociational government that aimed to defer constitutional issues 
Vol. 10, No. 2 Peace & Conflict Studies   Mac Ginty 48
and allow the development of cooperative relationships on the day-to-day governance of 
Northern Ireland.  
 
Post-peace accord elections 
 
Elections in the aftermath of a peace accord have the capacity to act as powerful 
indicators of the ‘state of the peace’ (Reilly, 2001; Reilly & Reynolds, 1999; Sisk & 
Reynolds, 1998). This can operate in a direct sense through an election (often a 
referendum) on a peace agreement. Similarly, support for moderate or extremist 
candidates or parties standing in local, regional or national elections may be gauged as a 
reinforcement or threat to post-accord peacebuilding. But elections can also act as 
indirect indicators, pointing to more subjective, and highly political concepts of 
moderation, respect for constitutional due process, and acceptance of diversity.  
Electoral processes can have incredible importance in awarding or stripping peace 
accords and political dispensations established under them with popular legitimacy.  The 
very staging of an election, the manner in which the election is run, the nature of the 
political parties and candidates, the issues that dominate the campaign, and the size and 
variety of parties can all have profound implications for the post-accord transition. To go 
through these in more detail, the holding of an election suggests capability and 
administrative competence, proficiencies not guaranteed in post-accord polities in which 
census data, if in existence, may be unreliable due to selective counting or enforced 
population shifts. Moreover, the holding of an election – by definition a major public 
event – may provide an opportunity to draw a line in the sand or to publicly mark the 
transition from conflict to ‘peace’. The manner in which the election is run may also be 
indicative of the post-accord peacebuilding phase of a peace process. Whether the 
campaign is marked by violence or intimidation, or the need for external guarantors in 
the form of peacekeepers or election monitors, may reflect the extent to which key 
principles underlying a peace accord have been internalised. Respect for the outcome of 
the election, particularly among majorities and powerholders, will be a crucial portent for 
the post-accord period.  
The nature and composition of political parties is also important, with a number 
of post-accord locations witnessing the almost overnight metamorphosis of militant 
groups into political parties. The development of political parties along this model may 
be a sign that politics will retrench rather than break from ethnic fissures. The issues that 
dominate post-accord election campaigns can be important in signalling the ‘health’ of 
the transition. This is particularly the case with regard to elections after the initial peace 
accord period. The extent to which the issue agenda has remained focused on ethnic and 
conflict related issues, as opposed to more functional public policy issues, may indicate 
the degree to which a conflict is still alive and resistant to peacebuilding initiatives 
(Reilly, 2003).  
The variety of political parties able to contest the post-accord elections may also 
inform observers about the nature of the post-accord political environment. A wide range 
of parties may not necessarily indicate political pluralism or tolerance from centres of 
authority. Instead, it may be a function of the type of electoral system, the fragmentation 
of ethno-political blocs, and political geography. 
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The timing of post-accord elections has attracted due attention, with critics 
pointing to the dangers of premature elections and how they are often held at the behest 
of the international community and are staged before the development of a broad-based 
‘democratic infrastructure’. Of equal importance in terms of timing, is the staging of 
elections subsequent to the initial post-accord election. In a number of post-accord 
societies parliamentary or presidential elections have been deferred or replaced by ‘back 
me or sack me’ referendums staged by the incumbent. A peaceful transition from the first 
post-accord leadership to its successor leadership can be taken as a sign of the 
institutionalisation of the post-accord political dispensation. 
The fundamental issue is whether post-accord elections are short-term events or 
part of long-term processes. Elections have the capacity to have ‘an ambiguous 
relationship’ to democracy, inflaming the conflict and retarding long-term 
democratisation (Lyon, 2002: 217). International ‘best practice’ during the 1990s saw an 
emphasis on the quantification of democracy through electoral processes. The symbolic 
content of post-accord elections is high (Mac Ginty, 2001: 1-21), but the ability of a 
democratic political cultural to become embedded in the society and polity is more 
significant. 
Northern Ireland, as part of an established democratic state, was without many of 
the basic post-accord electoral problems found in many other societies. There was a long 
tradition of elections, established sophisticated political parties and – despite persistent 
claims of electoral fraud - accurate electoral registers. Notwithstanding this history of 
electoral competition, Northern Ireland’s post accord elections are of enormous 
importance in providing evidence of the outworking of its peace accord. In the three 
years following the Belfast Agreement five elections were held: a referendum on the 
Agreement (May 1998) and elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly (June 1998), 
European Parliament (June 1999), Local Government (June 2001), and Westminster 
(June 2001).  
The high number of electoral contests in a relatively short space of time meant 
that Northern Ireland was in an almost permanent electoral cycle. While the Assembly 
gave Northern Ireland’s four main parties the opportunity to govern for the first time in 
many years, the switch from election campaigning to sharing power with electoral 
competitors proved difficult to manage in the delicate infant years of the Assembly. The 
Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, Sinn Féin, and the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party cooperated as part of the permanent powersharing 
government, yet they were competitors in elections to other chambers.i Reif and 
Schmitt’s second-order election model can help offer insights into the post-Belfast 
Agreement elections, particularly on issues of participation and the role of small parties.  
 
Second-order elections 
 
Reif and Schmitt’s seminal work identified national elections as first-order 
elections, with other elections designated as second-order. Their interest was in the 
connection between both sets of elections. The first direct elections to the European 
Parliament, held across the nine member states in 1979, provided them with an 
opportunity to compare voting behaviour in a single second-order political arena with 
nine national, or first-order, arenas. Their framework for the analysis of second-order 
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elections develops a series of hypotheses on the likely relationship between first and 
second-order elections (Marsh, 1998). The three main hypotheses are: 
1. That second-order elections will witness lower levels of participation. 
2. That second–order elections will facilitate the development and growth of 
new and small political parties. 
3. That national government parties will lose popularity in second-order 
contests. 
Reif and Schmitt highlight a number of contextual factors and conditions that 
should be taken into account when considering the hypotheses, such as possible 
differences in electoral systems and rules between first and second-order contests, the 
timing of the second-order election in the national election cycle, and the media attention 
devoted to the different contests. Essentially though, they highlight the precedence of 
national political cleavages over factors pertaining to the supra-national institution. In 
other words, national politics are a key determinant in second-order elections.  
Reif and Schmitt’s model has subsequently been refined – and largely validated – 
by others. Norris (1997, 109-114) refers to it as ‘strikingly prescient and immensely 
influential.’ Marsh (1998) tests it against four European elections in the 1979-97 period 
and finds it largely robust. Others have investigated the first and second-order election 
model in relation to national and sub-national elections. McAllister (2000, 211-222), 
writing on the 1999 elections to the Welsh National Assembly, identifies a low turnout 
and ‘a much more deliberate, sophisticated series of choices’ by voters as validating the 
notion of elections other than to the national tier as being ‘second-order’. 
Our task is to ascertain if Reif and Schmitt’s propositions hold true to Northern 
Ireland in the wake of the devolution of power from London. A validation or rejection of 
the second-order model may give an indication of the existence and extent of multi-level 
voting in post-accord Northern Ireland. It may also point towards the electorate’s 
acceptance of the devolved institutions in their own right or the extent to which the 
devolved exercises have been overshadowed by wider, national political dynamics. The 
three core propositions for second-order elections (lower participation; growth for small 
and new parties; and a contraction for government parties) are reviewed in the light of 
Northern Ireland’s first and second-order elections in the 1996-2001 period.ii On the basis 
of the evidence presented below, it is possible to construct a prima facie case in support 
of the first two propositions, although the third proposition has little relevance for 
Northern Ireland.  
An analysis section considers possible reasons for the variations in turnout and 
small party fortunes in first and second-order contests and highlights the importance of 
factors specific to Northern Ireland and its peace process. Indeed, the strength of these 
local factors challenges one of Reif and Schmitt’s key propositions: that national politics 
will be a major determinant on the outcome of second-order contests. While the British 
government plays a major role at the macro level, for example by setting election dates, 
Northern Ireland’s elections are decided by Northern Ireland-specific factors. In other 
words, the ‘national’ in Northern Ireland is Northern Ireland itself, rather than the UK. 
Added to this is the problem that the ‘nation’ is deeply divided. 
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Lower participation? 
 
According to Reif and Schmitt, second-order elections can be characterised by lower 
participation than in first-order elections. In fact it was a second-order election, the 1998 
Northern Ireland Assembly election that recorded the highest turnout in the 1996-2001 
period. The 69.9% turnout on that occasion however, was only slightly ahead of Northern 
Ireland’s turnout at the 1997 and 2001 British general elections (67.3% and 68.04% 
respectively).iii In the case of the Assembly election at least, it can be argued that 
Northern Ireland’s electors attached marginally more significance to a second-order 
rather than first-order contest. The Assembly elections apart, however, turnout for the 
general elections exceeded that for the other elections in the time-period and does allow a 
partial validation of Reif and Schmitt’s thesis of the precedence of the national political 
arena.iv (See Table 1). 
 
Election 1996 
Forum 
1997 
General 
Election 
1997 
Local 
Govt. 
1998 
Assembl
y 
1999 
European 
Parliament
2001 
Local 
Govt. 
2001 
General 
Election 
% 
Turnout 
64.7 67.3 54.7 69.9 57.04 66.02 68.04 
Table 1: Turnout in Northern Ireland elections, 1996-2001. 
  
Brighter prospects for small and new parties? 
 
Reif and Schmitt assert that second-order elections will offer brighter prospects 
for small and new parties. This is potentially significant for a post-accord society since 
the growth of small and new parties may signal a fragmentation of established ethnic 
bloc politics. In absolute terms, Northern Ireland has seen a relative proliferation of 
parties or independent candidates in its second-order contests. Twenty-four separate 
parties or independents contested the 1996 Forum elections and 33 parties or 
independents contested the 1998 Assembly election, as against 18 and 16 in the 1997 
and 2001 general elections respectively. Indeed, the Forum and Assembly elections 
witnessed the first electoral outing for a number of new or re-invigorated political 
parties. The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition was formed in advance of the 1996 
election, while the Progressive Unionist Party and Ulster Democratic Party, although 
already in existence, re-entered the electoral process for these elections. 
But the figures showing the relative proliferation of parties in second-order 
contests as opposed to first-order contests are less impressive if the larger number of 
seats available in the second-order contests is taken into account. In the 1996 Forum 
election an average of 3.6 candidates stood for each directly elected seat,v while an 
average of 2.7 candidates contested each seat in the 1998 Assembly election. These 
figures are lower than the average of 6.94 and 5.55 candidates who contested each of 
Northern Ireland’s eighteen seats in the 1997 and 2001 general elections. In the 1999 
European election eight parties contested Northern Ireland’s three Euro seats, or 2.6 per 
seat. 
Regardless of the actual contestation of elections, Reif and Schmitt’s main point 
was that small and new parties would perform relatively better in second-order than 
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first-order contests. A constant feature of Northern Ireland’s political landscape has 
been the dominance of four political parties: Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and Sinn Féin. In 
the period under consideration, they have between them secured an average of 85.16% 
of votes cast in each election, pointing to significant electoral oligarchy. The highest 
combined vote for ‘the Big Four’ (91.89%) occurred in a first-order election (2001 
general election) but this was only marginally ahead of the combined 91.36% secured in 
the 1999 European Parliament elections – a second-order contest. Nevertheless, smaller 
parties secured 21.05% of the vote in the 1998 Assembly election, with this figure 
dropping to 8.11% in the 2001 general election, pointing to a validation of Reif and 
Schmitt’s thesis. (See Table 2).    
 
Election 
1996 
Forum 
1997 
General 
Election 
1997  
Local 
Government
1998 
Assembly
1999 
European 
Parliament
2001 
Local 
Government 
2001 
General 
Election
% of 
votes 
cast for 
the ‘Big 
Four’ 
79.8 86.5 83.2 78.95 91.36 84.48 91.89 
Table 2: Combined percentage of the vote for the UUP, DUP, SDLP and SF in 1996-
2001 elections 
 
 
Government parties will lose popularity? 
 
Reif and Schmitt’s proposition that government parties will lose popularity in 
second-order elections is difficult to apply to Northern Ireland given that until the 
creation of the Assembly none of the parties had been members of a government for 
some time. If the proposition is modified to say that the dominant (rather than 
governing) political parties will lose popularity, then, as Table 2 shows, the ‘Big Four’ 
did experience some electoral slippage in second-order contests. But to argue this is to 
stretch Reif and Schmitt beyond their original meaning. Indeed, it is only through the 
second-order elections to the Assembly that Northern Ireland’s parties have experienced 
government, and as will be argued later, the attitudes to the devolved institutions (rather 
than performance in them) were key factors in the 2001 general election.  
 
Discussion 
 
On this evidence, it is possible to identify differences between the results in first 
and second-order elections in Northern Ireland and extend partial validation to the 
second-order election model. Local factors are worth stressing though. Many of the 
differences between first and second-order elections are specific to Northern Ireland and 
its peace process and may resist generalisation to other cases. 
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Turnout is highest in the 1998 Assembly election, but is generally higher in first-
order elections.  
It is unsurprising that turnout in the 1998 election to the devolved Assembly 
surpassed that for other elections. This was not a simple case of a re-arrangement of the 
locus of power from the centre to the periphery. Instead, the creation of the Assembly 
marked the institutional culmination of a complex and long-running peace process. Public 
interest was immense, as evidenced by the 81% turnout in the May 1998 referendum on 
the Belfast Agreement. The establishment of an Assembly per se met with relatively little 
opposition in the multi-party talks leading to the Belfast Agreement. Virtually everything 
else connected with the Assembly was contested though. The new institution’s name, 
location, size, method of election, number and competence of departments, and linkages 
with other bodies created under the Belfast Agreement, were all the subject of argument.  
There was much at stake for both communities. The 1998 referendum is thought 
to have produced a fairly even split between pro and anti-Agreement unionists (although 
both sides claimed to represent a majority of unionists) (Mitchell, 2001; 30-31). Most 
opposition came from the DUP, although substantial numbers of UUP supporters, 
including senior party figures, were opposed to the Agreement. Points of opposition were 
numerous, including the early release programme for paramilitary prisoners, the failure of 
paramilitary organisations to disarm and the prospect of major police reform. Perhaps the 
key sticking point for unionists was the prospect of the inclusion of Sinn Féin, whom they 
regarded as unreconstructed terrorists, in the new powersharing coalition Executive.vi  
Rather than boycotting the elections, anti-Agreement unionists were determined 
that ‘No’ voters should be represented in the Assembly. The Democratic Unionists, who 
had been absent from the political negotiations leading to the Belfast Agreement and who 
were bitterly opposed to the Agreement, nonetheless promised electors that they would 
‘be hard at work in the new Assembly representing your interests’ (emphasis added. 
DUP, 1998). Other anti-Agreement unionists, in the form of the United Kingdom 
Unionist Party, termed the election as ‘one FINAL CHANCE’ to counter a range of 
perceived threats, including ‘a return to full scale violence’ and ‘armed terrorists 
governing you’ (UKUP, 1998). 
The official message from the Ulster Unionist Party accentuated the positive. UUP 
leader David Trimble noted that, ‘We have the chance to move into a new era for the sake 
of our children and to seize the enormous economic benefits that will flow from the 
Agreement. For this we need to elect members dedicated to progress, not those there to 
wreck this chance or merely to oppose and complain about everything (UUP, 1998).’ The 
result was an emotive and bitter election campaign within unionism. 
Nationalists and republicans needed no encouragement to contest this election. 
Their traditional suspicions of Northern Ireland assemblies as ‘internal settlements’ had 
been assuaged by a number of guarantees linked to the establishment of the Assembly, 
particularly the ‘all-Ireland’ dimension afforded by the North-South Ministerial Council. 
For the two main nationalist parties, the SDLP and Sinn Féin, the Assembly represented 
an opportunity wrest power from Westminster. For republicans, it was another step in the 
broader nationalist project of moving towards a united Ireland, with Sinn Féin terming the 
election ‘a watershed moment in our history which must be seized’ (Sinn Féin, 1998a). 
The election also represented an opportunity to resume battle for supremacy within the 
nationalist community.  
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Most Northern Ireland elections are keenly contested, with the unionist-nationalist 
constitutional cleavage also containing bitter intra-community competitions. But the 1998 
Assembly election had an additional novelty and seriousness. There was a public 
understanding that this was a defining moment in the peace process, and would shape the 
new political dispensation. The Assembly may have been a subordinate institution, but for 
the main ethnic parties, it was essential that they secure maximum ownership of that 
institution and effect maximum denial to their political opponents. As a Sinn Féin election 
leaflet put it: ‘Your vote can maximise nationalist strength, deliver real change and 
advance Irish unity’ (Sinn Féin, 1998b).  
The 1998 Assembly election aside, turnout has been highest in first-order contests. 
It is difficult to argue that this was for anything other than local reasons. With the 
exception of a Conservative fragment (securing 0.3% of the vote in Northern Ireland in 
June 2001), the British parties do not stand for election in Northern Ireland. Nor has there 
been a recent need for Northern Ireland’s parties to contribute to Westminster coalition 
governments.vii The trends and issues affecting the outcome of the general election in 
England, Scotland and Wales have little bearing in Northern Ireland. Commenting in the 
Guardian during the 2001 general election campaign, Matthew Engel described Northern 
Ireland’s electoral exceptionalism in somewhat graphic terms:  
 
Elections in Britain are essentially homogenous: about the same arguments 
with local variations. But out here [Northern Ireland] the dispute between 
Blair and Hague and is barely even reported; Northern Ireland, as ever, 
disappeared up its own backside. It’s as though the PM’s [Prime 
Minister’s] decision to call an election also triggered a vote in Albania or 
Alpha Centauri (Guardian, 2001). 
 
Health, education, immigration, Europe, welfare spending and Deputy Prime 
Minister John Prescott’s pugilism, the issues that dominated the 2001 general election 
in England, Scotland and Wales, may as well have been issues from another planet. 
Northern Ireland’s general election was about Northern Ireland itself. But the 2001 
general election saw an interesting twist. While the national issue (Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional status) continued to dominate, attitudes to the Assembly gave entrenched 
disputes a new spin. In something of a reversal of the Reif and Schmitt thesis, issues 
germane to a second-order political arena dominated a first-order contest.  
Ever since April 1998, the Agreement (and by extension the Assembly) had 
dominated political debate in Northern Ireland. The traditional unionist-nationalist 
cleavage remained largely intact, but the Agreement gave it a new focal point and 
arenas of contestation. Post-Agreement politics revolved around rejection or acceptance 
of, deviation from, breaches of, implementation of, reviews of, and interpretations of 
the Agreement. As a result, the Agreement and its implications were the key issues in 
the June 1999 European and June 2001 Westminster elections, particularly within 
unionism.  
In fact, the DUP (1999) attempted to recast the European elections into a re-run 
of the referendum on the Agreement, describing it as electors’ ‘only chance to reverse 
the treachery of the past year’ and urging voters to give their leader Ian Paisley his 
highest ever vote. The Assembly was at the centre of the UUP general election 
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campaign. Their election literature told voters: ‘The choice couldn’t be clearer. The 
DUP want to destroy the Agreement, bringing down our Stormont Assembly. [UUP 
leader] David Trimble…needs every vote in order to stop them’ (UUP, 2001). David 
Trimble even made his pledge to resign as Assembly First Minister if the IRA refused 
to move on arms decommissioning a centre-piece of his Westminster campaign. In a 
sense, the first-order contest focused almost exclusively on issues relevant to the 
second-order arena.  
Second-order elections offer opportunities for new and small parties. Northern 
Ireland’s second-order elections, particularly the 1996 Forum and 1998 Assembly 
elections, have seen a proliferation of small and new parties. The peculiar circumstances 
of the peace process go a long way in explaining this phenomenon. A key factor has 
been the fragmentation of the unionist vote. Peace processes place political and military 
actors under enormous pressures, confronting them with new experiences, discourses, 
propositions and compromises (Darby & Mac Ginty 2003). While some political actors 
may be tempted to investigate compromise and pragmatism, others may take a more 
principled or resolute stand. The Northern Ireland peace process posed unionists, and 
the UUP in particular, with a series of difficult choices. The essential issue was one of 
whether they should engage with a peace process based on the idea of including those 
linked with militant organisations. For many within the UUP, and unionism in general, 
this meant compromising basic democratic principles. Once involved in the peace 
process, the dilemma became the extent of the involvement. Ultimately, with the Belfast 
Agreement, the issue became whether or not the UUP should enter into a powersharing 
government with Sinn Féin. Each hurdle, and attendant issues involving prisoners, 
policing and disarmament, placed unionism under immense pressure. Given such a 
context, it was unsurprising that a mixture of new and longstanding political rivals 
should attempt to exploit the apparent divisions within unionism when the electoral 
cycle presented them with the opportunity to do so.  
Added to this was the widespread unionist perception of the peace process in 
terms of concessions and loss. Many unionists regarded the peace process as a 
nationalist project in origin and design and one that would inevitably result in the 
erosion of the unionist position. In such circumstances, unionists were able to accuse 
each other of ‘selling out’, so producing a fertile ground for intra-unionist fissures.  
While nationalists and republicans, in the form of the SDLP and Sinn Féin, may 
have disagreed over the pace and extent of the peace process, they were largely in 
favour of the process. As a result, there was little evidence of a shredding of the 
nationalist vote during the peace process. Electoral competition between the SDLP and 
Sinn Féin was intense, and while Sinn Féin’s vote rose from 1996 onwards, the SDLP’s 
vote did not substantially decline (mainly as a result of a growing Catholic population). 
No serious electoral competitor emerged from within nationalism to threaten the SDLP 
or Sinn Féin. While Sinn Féin’s militant wing suffered desertions and discontent, this 
was not evident on the electoral front.  
The electoral systems chosen for the second-order contests may have also 
encouraged smaller parties to contest the elections. Certainly this was a conscious aim 
of those who designed the electoral systems. The principle of inclusion was a 
cornerstone of the peace process, and in the case of the 1996 Forum election in 
particular, the electoral system was designed to enhance the chances of the inclusion of 
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the small loyalist parties in future political negotiations.viii If anything, the ‘top-up’ 
system chosen was too successful with the tiny Northern Ireland Labour Party securing 
two ‘top-up’ seats with 0.85% of the vote.  
While we can use peace process-specific factors to explain the relative 
proliferation and prosperity of new and small parties in second-order elections, it must 
be noted that many of these factors also pertain to first-order contests in which the ‘Big 
Four’ dominate. 
 
Perceptions of the Assembly as a first order chamber 
 
Thus far there is evidence that Northern Ireland’s electors regard elections to the 
devolved second order Assembly as a first order contest. As argued, this is largely a 
function of factors pertaining to the ethno-national conflict, a conflict that has been - in 
certain respects - politically radicalised by the peace process. Data from the Northern 
Ireland Life and Times survey of political attitudes reinforces the view that Northern 
Ireland’s electors are willing to regard the Assembly as a first order institution. The 
survey sample was 1800 adults (67 per cent response rate) and was funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council.ix The fieldwork was conducted in October-
December 2001. It is worth noting that the period preceding the fieldwork, and the 
fieldwork period itself, witnessed considerable political instability.  
Asked first of all to identify the institution that has most say on how Northern 
Ireland is run, 51 per cent of respondents identify the UK government at Westminster as 
the institution wielding most power. (See Table 3). Twenty-eight per cent of respondents 
said that the Northern Ireland Assembly had most influence. This in itself is a significant 
figure given the Assembly’s uncertain beginnings. Other options, such as local 
government in Northern Ireland or the European Union attracted little support and it is 
worth noting that there was little divergence in Catholic and Protestant opinion with 
regard to where power lies.  
  
 Protestant Catholic All 
 % % % 
The Northern Ireland Assembly 29 28 28 
The UK government at Westminster 50 53 51 
Local Councils in Northern Ireland 6 8 7 
The European Union 4 5 4 
Other 3 1 2 
Don’t know 8 6 8 
Table 3: Which of the following has most influence over the way Northern Ireland is 
run? 
 
On the question of which institution should hold most influence on the way 
that Northern Ireland is run, a strong majority (65 per cent) opt for the Assembly. This 
comprises of majorities of both Catholics and Protestants, with the former more 
wholehearted in their support for the devolved institution. Seventeen per cent say that 
the UK government in Westminster should have most power, comprised of just under 
a quarter of Protestants and only 7 per cent of Catholics. Almost four times as many 
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people were prepared to award primacy in government to the Stormont Assembly that 
to the ‘mother of all parliaments’. The results indicate that people would like to see 
more power devolved to Northern Ireland.  
 
 Protestant Catholic All 
 % % % 
The Northern Ireland Assembly 61 74 65 
The UK government at Westminster 24 7 17 
Local Councils in Northern Ireland 6 8 7 
The European Union 1 3 2 
Other 2 1 2 
Don’t know 6 7 8 
Table 4: Which of the following ought to have most influence over  
the way Northern Ireland is run? 
 
Given devolution’s inauspicious start in Northern Ireland, these figures are 
remarkable. The summer and autumn of 2001 saw David Trimble’s resignation as First 
Minister in an attempt to force the IRA to begin decommissioning its arms. The period 
saw intensive political talks convened by the British and Irish governments, two 24 hour 
‘technical’ suspensions of the devolution, an attempt by the UUP and DUP to have Sinn 
Féin excluded from the Executive, and the resignation of the three UUP ministers from 
the Executive. The period also saw the ‘brawl in the hall’ when Members of the 
Legislative Assembly from a number of parties scuffled in the foyer of the Assembly in 
front of television cameras, as well as considerable sectarian violence on the streets. In 
October 2001 the IRA began actual decommissioning, enabling a modicum of political 
stability to return. 
Yet despite this unpromising context, the survey indicates that public faith in the 
devolved institution remains strong. Other survey results, for example on public 
perceptions of the Assembly’s handling of key policy areas such as health, education and 
the economy, are less flattering and suggest that public faith in the Assembly is just that: 
a faith that has yet to be realised. Nevertheless, the survey results reinforce the notion that 
many people in Northern Ireland regard the Assembly as a first order institution.  
A question remains though: do people in Northern Ireland regard the Northern 
Ireland Assembly as a first order institution as the most appropriate body within which to 
pursue constitutional issues? Or, do they regard it as an institution in which to prioritise 
day-to-day issues? The answer to the question is likely to have profound implications for 
the possibility of multi-level voting in future years. 
There are good reasons why electors might be tempted to view the Assembly as 
yet another, and perhaps as the most appropriate, arena for nationalist-unionist 
constitutional competition. The Assembly is more immediate and novel than other 
institutions. It is dedicated to Northern Ireland issues, attracts considerable local media 
attention, and provides a forum for face-to-face confrontation between nationalists, 
republicans, unionists and loyalists. If Northern Ireland’s electors regard the Assembly as 
an arena primarily to pursue constitutional claims, then the prospects of multi-level voting 
will be slim. Assembly elections will merely be an avenue for electoral warfare by other 
means. 
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On the other hand, people may regard the Assembly as a first order institution 
because of its capacity to deal with day-to-day issues. Under this scenario, there may even 
be scope for multi-level voting, with electors making decisions based on the actual 
performance of parties and politicians in the Assembly. Future Assembly elections will 
offer voters a chance to demonstrate multi-level voting, but given the Assembly’s rocky 
start, there can be few illusions.  
 
Conclusions 
 
A partial validation of the second-order election framework aside, there seems to 
be little evidence of multi-level voting in the sense of ethnic cleavages eroding. Thus far, 
devolution has not encouraged movement towards the political centre-ground, nor the 
prospect of voters crossing communal boundaries. The electoral fortunes of the cross 
community Alliance Party of Northern Ireland suffered disastrously during the peace 
process. Similarly, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, which deliberately eschewed 
taking positions on constitutional issues, failed to secure significant electoral success, 
(regardless of its other successes in facilitating talks between other parties). If anything, 
the nature of the peace process has encouraged a re-entrenchment of two sets of 
nationalism: a northern Irish nationalism and an Ulster British nationalism.  
The peace process and subsequent Agreement have emphasised the need to 
accommodate both sets of nationalism within a single political dispensation. Both were 
deemed legitimate. They would co-exist and their interaction would be managed through 
new consociational institutions. Nationalists would remain nationalist, and unionists 
would remain unionist. Moreover, following ceasefires, legitimacy and inclusion were 
extended to the more extreme versions of these nationalisms: republicanism and loyalism. 
The new political dispensation has many merits, and encouraging signs of ‘normality’ in 
government are emerging. Yet many of the underlying causes of the conflict remain un-
addressed. In many respects, the peace accord represented an ‘agreement’ rather than a 
‘settlement’. Reaching such an agreement was no small feat. The basic parameters of the 
conflict remain however, albeit moderated through a sophisticated array of institutions. In 
such circumstances, expectations of multi-level voting may be optimistic.  
Also apparent are the sensitivities associated with post-accord elections. Rather 
than marking the symbolic endpoint to a conflict, post-accord elections have the capacity 
to radicalise and re-entrench the conflict. This raises profound questions for the norms of 
liberalism and democracy that underpinned many of the international interventions into 
ethnonational conflicts from the 1990s and beyond. It seems clear that early elections 
have been counterproductive in a number of locations and have not engendered deep-
rooted processes of democratization. This raises awkward questions of alternatives and 
seeming double standards in which democracy is promoted in one area (Bosnia-
Herzegovina) but delayed and hollowed-out in another (Afghanistan).   
In many ways Northern Ireland’s problems were of a different magnitude to those 
in other post-accord zones. But Northern Ireland’s post-accord elections can offer a 
number of lessons to other societies embarking on the transition from violent conflict to 
‘peace’. First, the case illustrates that sophisticated electoral processes designed to 
maximize inclusivity in deeply divided societies offer few guarantees of an erosion of 
ethnic cleavages.  In simple terms, there are limits to electoral engineering if the bases of 
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the conflict remain intact. Second, the Northern Ireland case illustrates that although the 
symbolic value of post-accord elections is high, this is fleeting and less significant than 
substantial issues such as the outcome of the election. Third, and somewhat counter-
intuitively, electoral processes in the midst of on-going or unresolved conflicts can 
hamper democratisation. Tension from election campaigns to other chambers have 
disrupted the bedding down of Northern Ireland’s Assembly. Ideas of graduated 
democratisation in which there is an inter-regnum to allow for the development of a 
democratic culture are worth consideration. 
Fourth, concentration on inter-group competition in deeply divided societies often 
means that intra-group competition receives relatively scant attention. Yet, for many 
people in post-accord societies, competition within ethnic blocs will be their primary 
political experience. As a result, civil society initiatives designed to contribute to 
processes of democratisation may find it necessary to engage in single-identity work as 
well as cross-community activity. A final lesson from Northern Ireland may be more 
positive; that post-accord elections do have the capacity to change the boundaries of the 
conflict and offer opportunities for the emergence of new issues, personnel and political 
arenas. With time it will become clear if these new issues, personnel and political arenas 
can outweigh the inheritance of ‘old-style’ constitutional politics.  
 
Endnotes 
 
1 The Democratic Unionist Party, although taking their positions as Ministers in the 
Northern Ireland Executive, did not attend ministerial meetings in protest at the presence 
of Sinn Féin in government. They did participate in committee meetings that involved 
Sinn Féin though.  
2 Election figures are based on post-election results in the Irish Times and from the CAIN 
website: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/. 
The June 1998 referendum on the Belfast Agreement is not considered here because it 
was not an election to a specific chamber.  
3 Turnout in the May 1998 referendum on the Agreement was 80.98%. It is also worth 
noting that turnout was ahead of that in the 1999 elections to the Welsh National 
Assembly (46.4%) and Scottish Parliament (58.8%). 
4 It may be worth noting that the relatively high turnout recorded for the 2001 local 
government election may have been because the election was held on the same day as the 
general election.  
5 The Forum for Political Dialogue had 100 seats, of which 90 were directly elected and 
the ten parties polling the highest number of votes were awarded two ‘top-up’ seats each. 
6 The DUP Assembly election manifesto listed the following concerns on the back cover: 
Unreconstructed terrorists in government; the retention of illegal weapons by terrorists; 
the plans for the destruction of the RUC; All-Ireland bodies with executive powers; the 
mass release of terrorists; British sovereignty being eroded.  
7 With dwindling support from his own backbenches, John Major relied on the support of 
Ulster Unionist MPs to pass the 1993 Maastricht Bill. This did not lead to a formal 
coalition though. See Major (2000) 378-81. 
8 For an explanation of the electoral system, see ‘How delegates were elected’, Irish 
Times (1 June 1996). 
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9 The Northern Ireland Life and Times survey is continuous survey of social attitudes 
based at the University of Ulster and the Queen’s University of Belfast. The survey was 
conducted via face-to-face interviews with an achieved sample of 1800 adults across 
Northern Ireland. A Postcode Address File (PAF) sampling frame was used, with one 
adult from the household selected for interview using a Kish grid method. As is common 
in Northern Ireland, a simple random sample was drawn and stratified across three 
regions, but without any clustering. The face-to-face interviews were conducted using a 
computer-assisted technique. A self-completion supplement was given to each respondent 
at the end of the interview for the field workers to collect at a later date. 
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